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The Jurisdiction Argument for Immigration Control: A Critique 
Andy Lamey 
Introduction 
What does liberalism entail for immigration justice?1 A longstanding view 
suggests open borders. In the domestic sphere liberalism embraces rights, impartiality 
and diversity. Applied to immigration, these core commitments have often been 
thought to entail a right to immigrate held impartiality by citizens and foreigners 
alike.2 Indeed, the link between liberalism and open borders is so strong that the latter 
view is sometimes termed “global liberalism.”3 On this account, border control is only 
justified to the degree required to maintain a functioning welfare state, to prevent a 
national culture from being truly overwhelmed, or to uphold some other liberal good. 
Liberalism is widely taken to view the border practices of existing democratic states 
as “a gross violation of human liberty” and manifestly unjust.4 
That at least is the standard view. Increasingly however the philosophical literature 
on immigration sees liberal arguments for strong border control. Such views invoke 
                                                
1 I am grateful to two referees for comments that improved the article. One was anonymous, the other 
was Michael Blake, who requested that his identity be revealed. Blake’s responses to my criticisms 
were generous and open-minded, for which I am especially grateful. I offer critical responses to 
Blake’s report in footnotes below. 
2 For statements of this view see Roger Nett, “The Civil Right We Are Not Ready For: The Right of 
Free Movement of People on the Face of the Earth,” Ethics, 81/3 (1971), 212-227; Joseph Carens, 
“Migration and Morality: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective,” in B. Barry and R. Goodin (eds.), Free 
Movement: Ethical Issues in the Transnational Migration of People and Money (London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1992): 25-47; and Michael Dummett, On Immigration and Refugees (London: Routledge, 
2001).  
3 See the discussion of global liberals in Matthew Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal 
Democratic States and the Response to Refugees (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 59–
84.  
4 Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum, 60. 
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liberal commitments such as the right to freedom of association, the need to maintain 
public goods, or Rawlsian priority for the worst off (understood in national rather than 
international terms).5 The jurisdiction argument for immigration control, or 
jurisdictionism for short, is an important new theory of this kind. It maintains that 
states are justified in restricting immigration due to the fact that immigrants impose a 
new obligation on the people whose territories they enter, namely an obligation to 
protect and fulfill their rights. Insofar as this obligation is unwanted, immigrants limit 
the freedom of the polities they enter. Such polities can therefore be conditionally 
justified in turning immigrants away, so long as the immigrant are from a country that 
is capable of protecting and fulfilling their rights. Were someone from Haiti to seek to 
enter the United States for example, jurisdictionism would not permit forcibly 
returning her to Haiti, as the impoverished Caribbean nation is not an effective 
guarantor of rights. Were the immigrant Norwegian, however, the United States could 
turn her away, as she has access to Norway’s rights-protecting institutions.  
Jurisdictionism is an ingenious theory. It endorses the thought, widespread among 
not only global liberals but many other theorists of immigration, that the current entry 
policies of democratic states commit an injustice against would-be immigrants from 
poor countries. A widespread feature of contemporary immigration policy is to 
prioritize the entry of well-off, economically skilled immigrants over their unskilled, 
impoverished counterparts. Jurisdictionism is refreshing in reversing this priority and 
viewing poverty as a reason for admission. The theory does this due to an underlying 
                                                
5 See respectively Christopher Heath Wellman, “Immigration and Freedom of Association” Ethics 
119.1 (2008): 109-141; Joseph Heath “"Immigration, multiculturalism, and the social contract." 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 10/2 (1997) 343-61; and John Isbister “A Liberal 
Argument for Border Controls: Reply to Carens,” International Migration Review, Vol. 34, No. 2 
(Summer, 2000), 629-635. 
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commitment to moral equality. In this way it avoids taking on board anti-egalitarian 
premises that have plagued previous arguments for border control that were ostensibly 
liberal (see below).  
Jurisdictionism’s original twist is to harnesses its liberal features to a significant 
and extensive form of border control, one that may be less restrictive than current 
state practice, but nonetheless falls well short of the open borders advanced by global 
liberals. The means by which the theory does so, citing the obligations that arise when 
someone enters a new national territory, is an original move that to my knowledge has 
not previously been made in the debate over border control. The uncontroversial 
concept of jurisdiction moreover is one that attracts wide support across different 
theories of justice. Not just liberal, but utilitarian, libertarian and other theories 
endorse the state as an institution with legitimate authority over a set territory. If true 
therefore the jurisdiction argument offers a rationale for border control that will 
potentially have implications for philosophies beyond liberalism. 
But is it true? Despite its genuinely appealing features the jurisdiction argument 
has problems. One of these concerns the theory’s account of obligation. According to 
this account, we sometimes have an obligation to take on a new obligation to 
someone, as when our spouse becomes ill and we are obliged to take care of him or 
her. Jurisdictionism maintains that we do not have any equivalent obligation to take 
on new obligations to would-be immigrants. This view however is mistaken, and 
overlooks how we can be obliged to take on new duties to would-be immigrants, 
including ways that, despite its official denial, are endorsed by jurisdictionism itself. 
Jurisdictionism also seems to employ two different standards when determining 
whether an obligation exists, one of which is sensitive to consequences, the other not. 
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A third problem is that the theory mischaracterizes the relationship between 
obligation and freedom. Jurisdictionism maintains that taking on a new obligation 
necessarily reduces the freedom of the obliged. Yet it is possible for someone to 
impose a new obligation on me while increasing my freedom, as when they 
simultaneously release me from one or more other commitments. Given this 
possibility, the argument is wrong to necessarily equate the creation of a new 
obligation with a reduction in freedom. In the specific case of immigrants, the theory 
overlooks the diverse ways they can lighten the load of a receiving society’s existing 
obligations, as by, for example, creating efficiencies of scale in the delivery of public 
goods. Jurisdictionism, finally, is not able to satisfactorily address the case of an 
immigrant from a rights-protecting state who signs a waiver releasing the receiving 
society of all obligations to him or her. While there are good reasons not to offer such 
waivers, they are not reasons available to jurisdictionism, which shows there is no 
automatic link between jurisdictional presence and a right to exclude.   
The Jurisdiction Argument 
Jurisdictionism is the brainchild of Michael Blake.6 His project is to derive a right 
to exclude immigrants from the nature of states, presuming little beyond a background 
theory of obligation. To that end Blake plausibly posits three features which a state 
must possess in order to be a state: a government able to exercise control through 
coercion, a portion of the globe’s surface over which that control is exerted, and a 
local population that is the subject of that control. Given these necessary features, a 
state is defined by its effective jurisdiction over part of the earth’s territory. Blake 
                                                
6 My reconstrual of jurisdictionism follows “Immigration, Jurisdiction, and Exclusion,” Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 41/2 (2013): 103-130; “The Right to Exclude,” Critical Review of International Social 
and Political Philosophy ahead-of-print (2014): 1-17; and “Immigration and Political Equality,” San 
Diego Law Review 45/4 (2008), 963-980. 
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notes that the question of immigration only makes sense if one assumes something 
like this essential feature is true of states. In a situation of one world government, 
immigration would not occur.  
In addition to a theory of statehood, jurisdictionism also posits an account of 
human rights. It is based on the observation that the division of the world into states 
has ramification for the implementation of such rights. While human rights are 
universal, they ascribe different enforcement responsibilities depending on whether 
human beings are inside or outside a given state’s jurisdiction. Thus a familiar 
division in rights-theory speaks of the tripartite obligation to respect, protect and 
fulfill rights. States are obliged to respect the human rights of everyone. States have 
additional responsibilities however for the protection and fulfillment of the rights of 
individuals within their jurisdiction.7 
This view of rights can explain why the U.S. government attracts criticism for 
launching drone strikes that kill foreign nationals abroad, yet receives no equivalent 
criticism for refraining from fulfilling the right of French citizens in France to basic 
health care. Opposition to drone strikes is based on the view that the U.S. should 
respect human rights universally, even though it is not also obliged to protect and 
fulfill rights universally. In the case of French citizens, the latter responsibility 
belongs to the French government. Were a French person to visit the United States as 
a tourist however, the U.S. government would then be obliged to fulfill her rights, 
such as the right to be free from assault. The different responsibilities of governments 
are determined by the location of individuals within different national jurisdictions. 
State responsibilities however are also determined by whether or not a foreign 
national abroad has functioning institutions capable of fulfilling his rights. Indeed, a 
                                                
7 For ease of presentation I will refer to rights fulfillment, presuming it to include rights protection. 
 6 
crucial feature of jurisdictionism is that states can have obligations to non-citizens 
abroad whose rights will not otherwise be fulfilled. “American citizens may have 
obligations to the citizens of Somalia to help create political institutions in that 
country,” Blake writes, referring to political institutions that not merely respect, but 
fulfill, the rights of Somalis.8 But insofar as we have individuals from rights-fulfilling 
states such as France in mind, other rights-fulfilling states are not obliged to fulfill 
their rights until they arrive within those other states’ borders. What is true of states is 
also true of their residents. When a newcomer arrives in my liberal country of 
residence, I incur some obligation to fulfill her rights, if only by paying to support 
rights-fulfilling laws and political institutions. I did not have this obligation when she 
was living in another state with institutions and residents able to fulfill her rights.  
If this picture is true then when an immigrant from one rights-fulfilling state enters 
the jurisdiction of another it triggers a change in obligations. A French immigrant to 
the U.S. leaves behind the right to have French institutions be the immediate fulfiller 
of her rights. She retains the right to return to France, but not the right to be subject to 
French rights-fulfillment while in the U.S. What she loses in regard to the French 
government she gains from the American one, as U.S. institutions must now fulfill her 
rights. The same is true of individual Americans. As Blake puts it, they now have 
both a moral and legal obligation to take some active interest in her rights, which they 
did not have when she was in France: 
 
[T]hey are obligated to help pay for the police that will defend her 
physical security, they are obligated to serve on juries that that will 
serve to convict those who attack her, and indeed, they are obligated to 
help create and sustain institutions sufficient to protect her basic human 
rights. This obligation, it should be noted, emerges from the simple fact 
                                                
8 Blake, “Immigration, Jurisdiction and Exclusion,” 114. 
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of presence; no particular legal status within the jurisdiction is 
required.9 
 
Again, if we have in mind citizens of Somalia and other countries unable to uphold 
basic rights, the situation is different. In their case it is possible that we many have 
extensive obligations to fulfill their rights while they are still in Somalia (the answer 
will depend in part on whether other states have effectively intervened in Somalia). 
But insofar as we have in mind migrants from one rights-upholding state to another, 
entering a new jurisdiction entails a new obligation on the part of the receiving state. 
This fact provides a rationale for excluding immigrants from rights-upholding 
states. As Blake summarizes it: 
 
states may refuse to allow immigrants to come in, because the residents of 
those states have the right to refuse to become obligated to those would-be 
immigrants. This general right imposes a duty on would-be immigrants to 
cite some particular reason why these residents have an obligation to 
become obligated to these immigrants. In the absence of such a reason, it 
appears that the state has the right to use coercion to prevent the would-be 
immigrant from entering into the jurisdiction of the state, since it is the 
simple fact of presence within that jurisdiction that invokes the obligation 
to protect the migrant’s basic rights.10 
 
In other words, citizens of liberal states are entitled to refuse the new obligation 
that immigrants impose on them, as this impinges upon their freedom. Legal 
obligations limit what we can do without facing certain consequences: if I steal your 
car it entails that I go to jail. In the case of a moral obligation, it limits the moral right 
of an obliged individual to do certain things. Promising to look after your children for 
the night, for example, obviates my right to do anything other than babysit tonight. 
Either way, the legal and moral obligations triggered by immigrants both 
                                                
9 Blake, “Immigration, Jurisdiction and Exclusion,” 113. 
10 Blake, “Immigration, Jurisdiction and Exclusion,” 120.  
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circumscribe the zone of permissible action. In order to avoid these unwanted limits 
on freedom, citizens of liberal states can be justified in turning immigrants away. 
This argument presumes that members of a receiving society possess “a 
presumptive right to be free from others imposing obligations on us without our 
consent.”11 A possible objection is to attack this right, on the grounds that it has 
absurd implications. When I am walking down the street, for example, if a stranger 
collapses near me, I am obliged to come to his aid. This obligation, like that which 
jurisdictionism associates with the arrival of immigrants, can be considered a product 
of physical proximity. Might we therefor forcibly drive fellow pedestrians away from 
us, to avoid having to come to their aid? Similarly, when my friends and family have 
children, they impose new obligations on me in virtue of my relationship with them, 
beyond that of defending their children’s legal and moral rights. I will now also be 
obliged to interact with their offspring in various ways, as babysitter, patient listener 
and shared user of social space. The right to be free of unwanted obligations is a 
strange right indeed if it implies that we can give birth control to our colleagues to 
avoid unwanted obligations to their children. 
According to Blake, the right to be free of unwanted new obligations avoids these 
absurd implications. This is because it can be outweighed by other considerations. 
Our fellow citizens for example have a right to the use of public space that trumps our 
right to avoid obligations to them. Similarly, in the case of family and friends, their 
right to bodily autonomy is more important than my right to avoid unwanted 
obligations. In both cases there is “an existing obligation to acquire such new 
obligations.”12 But in the case of someone entering my country from a rights-fulfilling 
                                                
11 Blake, “Immigration, Jurisdiction and Exclusion,” 115. 
12 Blake, “Immigration, Jurisdiction and Exclusion,” 119. 
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state, it is not at all clear that my right to be free of unchosen obligations should be 
disregarded. Rather the new obligation is an “unwarranted interference with 
freedom,” which I can reject, as there is no countervailing consideration outweighing 
my right to freedom.13  
An important feature of Blake’s account is the distinction it draws between 
obligation and cost. There is no presumption that immigrants impose a significant 
financial cost on their receiving society. In the case of the French woman, we might 
imagine her to be a millionaire who pays taxes and makes no use of social programs. 
Yet even a millionaire generates new obligations to uphold her rights when she enters 
a new jurisdiction. These new obligations may be mild, but Blake argues that this is 
beside the point. The costs of meeting an obligation are of limited relevance to our 
overall assessment of the obligation. If two people impose unwanted obligations on 
us, one of which is much more onerous, we are entitled to protest the more severe 
obligation to a greater degree. But the issue here is the legitimacy of having to take on 
a new obligation in the first place, and this question is not answered by reference to 
the obligation’s cost. “I cannot justify an imposed relationship of obligation with 
reference to the lightness of its burdens,” Blake writes, “any more than I can justify 
my breaking into your house with reference to the fact that I am likely to make things 
tidier for you once I am in there.”14 Even a burglar who breaks and cleans acts without 
permission, and so does something wrong. By the same logic, even if the obligations 
that an immigrant imposes on society are small, society is still entitled to turn her 
                                                
13 Blake, “Immigration, Jurisdiction and Exclusion,” 115. 
14 Blake, “Immigration, Jurisdiction and Exclusion,” 117. 
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away, as the immigrant “imposes an obligation on those who have no independent 
obligation to be so obliged.”15 
On Blake’s account a state has wide discretion when it comes to exercising its right 
to exclude. It might turn immigrants away to foster cultural solidarity or unity, for 
example, or some other social good. Not any reason will do, however. It must be the 
case that “the goods cited in defense of a particular use of the right are, in fact, goods 
a liberal state is entitled to pursue.”16 Call this the liberal proviso. It would rule out a 
blatantly racist immigration policy that favoured members of one race over another. 
Such a policy violates the proviso by treating prospective immigrants as “morally 
unequal to one another.”17 It is perfectly consistent with the proviso however to not 
treat prospective immigrants as equal to citizens when it comes to their right of entry. 
Rather the state can point to the fact that would-be immigrants, unlike the existing 
population, generate a new obligation through their physical arrival.  
An implication of jurisdictionism is that entities other than states, whether sub-
national entities such as California and San Diego, or international entities such as the 
European Union, also have a right to exclude. Blake accepts this implication, but 
notes that sub-national entities cease to posses this right when they become part of a 
national unit that consciously forms a single political community. By the same logic, 
member states of the European Union no longer have the right to turn away 
individuals from other member states. One might suggest that the entire world today 
occupies a common political community, thereby obviating the right of states to 
exclude anyone according to Blake’s account. But he notes that there is no global 
                                                
15 Blake, ““Immigration, Jurisdiction and Exclusion,” 117. 
16 Blake, ““Immigration, Jurisdiction and Exclusion,” 121. 
17 Blake, “Immigration and Political Equality,” 971. 
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institutional framework that fosters a common community the way European 
institutions do. Thus the fact that we do not think it permissible for San Diego or 
California to police their borders does not prevent the United States and other 
countries from doing so. As for the EU, its members can turn away individuals from 
non-EU countries with acceptable rights records, and so on Blake’s account it is 
effectively a single immigration jurisdiction. 
Why Jurisdictionism Matters 
This then is jurisdictionism. It avoids anti-egalitarian commitments by confines its 
political premises to those liberal philosophy already endorses. In this way it is 
superior to other recent arguments for immigration control. 
Consider the freedom of association argument advanced by Christopher Heath 
Wellmann. Wellman argues that just as individuals have a right to freedom of 
association, so do states. Such a right protects not only our interest in associating with 
certain people, but our interest in not associating with others, including others of 
certain races. As Wellman notes, “if the importance of freedom of association entitles 
racist individuals to marry exclusively within their race, why does it not similarly 
entitled racist citizens to exclude immigrants based upon race?18” 
Wellman’s answer to this question distinguishes between members of a racial 
group who are already present in a particular country and other members of the same 
race living abroad who might want to move to that country. Members of the group 
who are already present would be disrespected by an immigration policy that said no 
further members of their race are welcome. Applied to a racist immigration policy 
such as White Australia, the problem with such a policy is the disrespect it exhibits 
toward Asians already present in Australia. For this reason, the actual white Australia 
                                                
18 Wellman, “Immigration and Freedom of Association,” 138 (see note one). 
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policy that historically existed was unjust on Wellman’s account. While this is some 
consolation, it bears noting that racist disrespect exhibited toward immigrants 
themselves is permitted by Wellman’s account. Hence Wellman’s admission that a 
White Australia policy would be just in an alternative universe where “Australia were 
already composed exclusively of White citizens.”19 Wellman’s account would 
additionally permit a racist immigration policy in an Australia that had many non-
white citizens. Just so long as there were no Asians, say, it would be permissible to 
legally turn away Asian immigrants, as no current Australians would be disrespected. 
It will come as no surprise that Wellman’s view has attracted criticism.20 Although 
it is rights-based, and so deploys a key liberal notion, it endorses an absolute 
conception of the right to freedom of association, untempered by any commitment to 
other liberal goods such as anti-discrimination and state-neutrality. Liberalism is 
traditionally opposed to state-sanctioned racism, which in the national sphere is 
something it has traditionally sought to rule out categorically, as when Rawls for 
example rules out racial segregation through the use of the Veil of Ignorance. An 
unappealing feature of Wellman’s account is that it cannot categorically rule out racist 
immigration policies. 
 Wellman’s argument is not the only case for immigration control that permits 
some form of discrimination. David Miller for example rejects immigration laws that 
endorse “discrimination on grounds of race, sex, or, in most instances religion.” 
                                                
19 Wellman, “Immigration and Freedom of Association,” 140. 
20 Blake, M. “Immigration. Association and Antidiscrimination,” Ethics 122, (2012), 748-762; 
Cavallero, E. “Association and Asylum,” Philosophical Studies (online first), March 2012, 1-9; 
Wilcox, S. “Do Duties to Outsiders Entail Open Borders?: A Reply to Wellman,” Philosophical 
Studies (online first), March 2012, 1-10. For Wellman’s reply to Cavallero and Wilcox see 
“Immigration Restrictions in the Real World,” Philosophical Studies (online first), April 2012, 1-4. 
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Miller would however permit immigration policies that discriminate according to 
religion, so long as a preferred faith “forms an essential part of the public culture, as 
in the case of the state of Israel.”21 Perhaps there are considerations in the Israel case, 
such as Judaism’s status as a minority religion that has historically been threatened, 
which could somehow render Israeli immigration policy consistent with liberal 
principles. Miller’s theory however permits religious discrimination even when the 
religion in question is well represented and not under threat. It would thus permit 
telling someone they are welcome to live in an officially Muslim or Christian state 
only so long as they embrace Allah or Christ.  
Jurisdictionism is impeccably liberal in the way it avoids discriminatory measures 
such as those permitted by Wellman and Miller. The rationale for excluding 
immigrants is the desire to avoid unwanted new obligations, which as we’ve seen is 
compatible with a prohibition on discriminating between immigrants based on racial, 
religious or ethnic grounds. The theory thus decouples the justification for limiting the 
number of immigrants from any justification for limiting certain kinds of immigrants, 
two considerations that are not separated in the rationales of Wellman and Miller. The 
jurisdiction rationale is thus an impartial justification for immigration control. 
Whereas an egalitarian liberal might shrug in reply to Wellman or Miller: “so much 
for an absolute conception of freedom of association or a national public culture,” 
liberalism endorses the notion of territorial jurisdiction. Liberals thus cannot evade 
jurisdiction’s conclusion by simply rejecting its central premise. It is harder to rebut 
than arguments for restriction that endorse illiberal discrimination. 
Jurisdictional considerations will potentially arise in any world divided into 
territorial states, even a world of perfect international equality. If the theory is correct 
                                                
21 Miller, “Immigration: The Case for Limits,” 204.  
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it thus forces us to grapple with a right to exclude immigrants “derived simply in 
virtue of the state’s jurisdictional nature.”22 As Blake summarizes this central aspect 
of jurisdictionism, its goal is “to describe a state in its most basic terms, those without 
which we would not describe the thing in question as a state at all, and then to see 
what in this image could be used to develop the right to exclude.”23  Jurisdictionism 
seeks to make its case presuming the same feature, the existence of states, which 
makes immigration possible in the first place. This presumption is not one a 
proponent of free migration between states can dismiss, for obvious reasons. 
The Obligation to Be Obliged 
Hannah Arendt famously spoke of the right to have rights.24 Jurisdictionism 
presents a similar notion in the idea of an obligation to accept a new obligation. Call 
this a meta-obligation for short. Blake suggests that this is the key feature that 
distinguishes our relationships involving family and friends from those involving 
would-be immigrants. This aspect of the theory however faces two problems. One, 
there is no non-arbitrary way to outline a sphere of meta-obligation that excludes 
potential immigrants. Two, jurisdictionism actually recognizes meta-obligations to 
foreigners outside our national borders, despite its official disavowal.  
Our friends and family members are not the only individuals who impose new 
obligations on us through childbirth. So do fellow citizens. Indeed, compared to 
immigration, reproduction is a far more common way for new individuals to enter a 
polity. It seems in keeping with both jurisdictionism and reason to think that we stand 
in a relation of meta-obligation to fellow citizen. This relation may not require us to 
                                                
22 Blake, “Immigration, Jurisdiction and Exclusion,” 108. 
23 Blake, “Immigration, Jurisdiction and Exclusion,” 108. 
24 The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Schocken, 2004 [1951]), 296-7. 
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take on as many new obligations as do our bonds of family and friends (not unless we 
are willing to babysit at a national level). Even so, Blake’s example of the duties that 
come with sharing public space with others suggests the reasonable thought that 
citizenship, like friendship, is a relation that comes with some obligation to take on 
new obligations. The fact that political communities have historically imposed new 
obligations on their subjects, from taxation to conscription, further attests to the 
plausibility of this view. 
Immigrants aside however, citizenship is something most people are born into. 
Liberalism has historically been skeptical of the idea of grounding claims of justice in 
accidents of birth. As a liberal argument for border control, jurisdictionism takes such 
skepticism seriously. In a discussion of oppressive states, for example, Blake asks 
whether their citizens have a greater responsibility to reform them than non-citizens 
do, and answers that they do not. “To insist that this relationship [of citizenship] 
generates duties, then, is something very much like insisting that an ascriptive fact—a 
mere fact of birth—is sufficient to generate an obligation. This, however, seems to be 
morally impermissible.”25 Skepticism about the moral relevance of mere facts of birth 
here is warranted. But by the same token, why should an accident of birth undergird 
an obligation to take on obligations to co-nationals but not to foreigners? Surely it is 
arbitrary to say the boundary of citizenship marks the limit of our meta-obligations. 
Rather we should recognize that we can be obliged to take on new obligations to non-
citizens, a category which includes would-be immigrants.   
Jurisdictionism appears to recognize as much. As we saw, the theory recognizes 
that American citizens may have obligations to citizen of Somalia to help create 
rights-fulfilling political institutions. This is an important feature that distinguishes 
                                                
25 Blake, “Immigration, Jurisdiction and Exclusion,” 128. 
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our relationship with Somalis from our relationship with citizens of France. But if this 
is the case, it means passages justifying turning away immigrants in the name of our  
“general right to avoid unwanted obligations where we have no obligation to become 
obliged,” are not correct.26 Foreign individuals who might immigrate are people to 
whom we can be obliged to take on new obligations.27  
Consider someone in an alternative Somalia before it collapsed into anarchy. In 
this alternative universe, unlike ours, Somalia pre-collapse was a liberal state that 
upheld its citizens’ rights. On the jurisdiction account, during this period citizens of 
other liberal states were not obliged to fulfill the rights of Somalis. After the collapse 
however residents of liberal states become obliged to Somalis. We now must rebuild 
Somalia or admit them as immigrants. Either way we are taking a step that fulfills, 
rather than merely respects, their rights.  
Now suppose that the alternative Somali government is restored, and again 
becomes capable of fulfilling its citizens’ rights. A Somali then seeks to immigrate to 
a liberal state. The reason jurisdictionism cites for turning her away is that residents of 
the receiving society have “no obligation to be obliged” to her. But this is not true on 
jurisdictionism’s own account. The theory acknowledges that our relationship to 
                                                
26 Blake, “Immigration, Jurisdiction and Exclusion,” 120. 
27 Such a view is also suggested by Blake’s mention of universal jurisdiction, which holds that certain 
crimes are of “sufficient gravity” that they can be prosecuted anywhere—including a state in which 
neither the perpetrators nor victims were citizens, (“Immigration, Jurisdiction and Exclusion,” 112). It 
is hard to make sense of such a law without granting weight to the thought that such prosecutions need 
to take place, and insofar as our laws endorse universal jurisdiction, our institutions may need to 
initiate such a trial. If so then we can be “obligated to set up instruments designed to provide tools by 
which rights-violators might be brought to justice,” even in cases where all the individuals involved are 
outside a state’s territorial jurisdiction. (“The Right to Exclude,” 11). This would appear to undermine 
Blake’s claim that the state is “obliged to protect and fulfill the rights of only some humans, namely, 
those who happen to be present within its territorial jurisdiction” (“Immigration, Jurisdiction and 
Exclusion,” 111). 
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potential immigrants is one that can involve new binding obligations, whether we 
want then or not, just so long as a certain condition holds. The condition is that the 
immigrants’ government is no longer able to fulfill their rights.  
In the case of individual immigrants, they always retain the potential to give rise to 
new obligations, even when their government perfectly fulfills their rights. The 
possibility of our relationship giving rise to a new obligation always holds, even when 
the condition that activates the new obligation does not. The theory’s official account 
misdescribes what is going on. The immigrant can potentially generate an obligation 
before ever crossing our border, as the obligation of a state to fulfill rights is not, in 
fact, “emphatically local.” 28 
Is there a way around this problem? One possibility is that jurisdictionism need not 
go so far as to suggest that we lack meta-obligations to potential immigrants. Instead 
we may simply have weaker and more conditional meta-obligations to them. Unlike 
the bond of friendship, which automatically includes the obligation to take on new 
obligations to our friend’s children, regardless of how well-off our friends are, our 
                                                
28 “Immigration, Jurisdiction and Exclusion,” 111. In his referee report (see footnote one) Blake 
accepts that jurisdiction does in fact recognize an obligation to obliged to Somalis and other non-
citizens. “I accept that morality requires something like cosmopolitan regard – we must take humans as 
fundamental units of value, globally rather than locally – but this does not entail that we much accept 
the particular obligations to others that make up the basis of political relationships [between citizens].” 
My Somalia example however is not meant to suggest that jurisdictionism’s premises entail that we 
must extend the obligations of citizenship to non-citizens. My goal rather is the more modest one of 
showing that jurisdictionism does in fact recognize an “obligation to be obliged” to non-citizens, 
despite is official disavowal. In response, Blake’s report now suggests that what distinguishes citizens 
and non-citizens is that we have different obligations to either group. This however seems a separate 
argument than the one I am criticizing. As such it would appear to concede the criticism. Furthermore, 
the purpose of Blake’s argument is to justify different obligations to citizens and non-citizens. This 
passage of his report however seems to assume the truth of such an idea. 
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relationship with potential immigrants does not automatically give rise to meta-
obligations. Rather they obtain only in narrowly defined circumstances, such that, if 
we do not admit an obligation to the would-be immigrant, the outcome for them 
would be disastrous.  
Call this construal soft jurisdictionism. It is suggested by a passage in which Blake 
speaks of a “limited right to refuse to undertake responsibility for others’ rights, when 
those rights are already protected.”29 On this construal, what is important is not just a 
fact about us—the absolute boundary of our meta-obligations—but a fact about the 
immigrants, the outcome for them if we do not recognize a new obligation.   
Soft jurisdictionism can explain why a would-be immigrant from a rights-fulfilling 
state is different from the other cases cited above. In the case of someone in a failed 
state, the consequences of our state not fulfilling her rights, either through nation-
building or admission, could potentially see her most important human rights go 
unfulfilled. In the case of someone who wants to move from France to the United 
States, by contrast, she still has access to her most fundamental rights. It is just that 
she has to access them in France and not the U.S. One immigrant meets a threshold of 
need that the other does not. On this construal, what is decisive about the case of the 
immigrant from a non-rights-fulfilling state is the consequence of our turning her 
away.30 In pointing to this consequence she can “cite some particular reason” for 
admittance particular to her case.  
                                                
29 “The Right to Exclude,” 13. 
30 Construing jurisdictionism as granting weight to consequences is not the same as saying it is 
consequentialist. In the words of Rawls, a prominent critic of consequentialism, “deontological theories 
are defined as non-teleological ones, not as views that characterize the rightness of institutions and acts 
independently from their consequences. All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences 
into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” A Theory of 
Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971), 30.   
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I believe this construal of jurisdictionism is more plausible than one that fails to 
recognize meta-obligations to foreigners. Once this construal is in sight, however, it 
also faces two serious problems. One, it does not adequately distinguish immigrants 
from citizens. There will be cases in which turning citizens away at the border will 
not see their fundamental rights denied either. Two, granting weight to the negative 
consequences of not meeting an obligation is in tension with jurisdiction’s view that 
an obligation cannot be justified by reference to the lightness of its burden on the 
obliged. The first problem is unique to soft jurisdictionism while the second also 
applies to its official “hard” counterpart. 
Citizenship and Obligations 
Imagine a twist in the case of the French would-be immigrant to the USA. While 
she was born in France and grew up there, one of her now-deceased parents was 
American, so she has dual French-U.S. citizenship.31 This of course is a common 
occurrence, as many liberal states allow citizenship to be passed on to children born 
abroad. It is normal to think that such individuals are automatically entitled to live in 
either country of citizenship. Soft jurisdictionism however is not able to capture this 
widely accepted aspect of modern citizenship.  
In the case of the dual citizen, she has the same access to rights-fulfilling 
institutions as other French citizens do. Were she to seek to enter the U.S., only to be 
                                                
31 For a criticism of jurisdiction similar to the one made here see Michael Kates and Ryan Pevnick, 
“Immigration, Jurisdiction and History,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 42/2 (2014), 189. Kates and 
Pevnick take issue with jurisdiction’s differing account of obligations to the native born vs. the foreign 
born. My example of the foreign-born citizen, by contrast, concerns the difference between obligations 
to citizens and non-citizens. In response to Kates and Pevnick, Blake can emphasize the territorial 
aspect of his theory, according to which, “the state is instead obliged to protect and fulfill the rights of 
only some humans, namely, those who happen to be present within its territorial jurisdiction.” My 
example, by contrast, bypasses this aspect of Blake’s theory, 
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turned away, the outcome would thus be the same as in the case of the would-be 
immigrant from France who lacks American citizenship. We might wonder if the dual 
national is being cut off from loved ones in the United States, such as her 
grandparents. Yet something similar could be true of a would-be immigrant. Perhaps 
for example the French person was seeking to move to the United States to marry 
someone who was unable to leave the U.S.32 If political consequences are all that 
matter, it will thus be permissible for liberal states to turn away both immigrants and 
citizens who have access to rights-fulfilling institutions in other countries. 
Against this, a soft jurisdictionist could bite the bullet and hold that a right to enter 
liberal states is only held by individuals born in them. Alternatively, the theory might 
seek to cite some factor which extends an automatic right of entry to foreign-born 
citizens but not to non-citizens. Both moves however generate an obligation of justice 
from a mere fact of birth, ether to where it occurred or the nationality of the parents. 
Both are ruled out by jurisdictionism’s liberalism, which is its most appealing and 
distinctive feature.33  
                                                
32 “The Right to Exclude,” 14.  
33 In his referee report Blake moots a different possible reason why it is not permissible to turn a citizen 
away at the border. Doing so fails to take into account the citizen’s “project of agency,” which includes 
his “understand[ing of] himself as a continuing agent,” an understanding which includes a view of 
himself as a member of his society of citizenship. Even if the citizen were relocated to another country 
that fulfills his rights, therefore, he would still be denied something fundamental to his identity. As 
Blake puts it, “The citizen, on my view, has interests in the life he has already built in his country of 
residence, and does not hold those interests wrongly; we would undermine his ability to understand 
himself as a continuing agent, if we were to take from him access to all those resources and 
relationships he has built within his society.”  
I do not think this response succeeds, for two reasons. One, it fails to take into account immigrants who 
have a similar project of agency, according to which they also see themselves as rightful members of a 
country of immigration. To take but one example, I might be born in the Dominican Republic, but have 
as my central project of agency immigrating to the United States in order to play major league baseball. 
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The Cost-Benefit Asymmetry 
Hard and soft jurisdictionism disagree on the nature of our meta-obligations to 
citizens. Both construals however grant weight to the potential consequences for the 
immigrant when determining if she can justifiably be turned away. This consequence-
sensitive aspect of the theory poses its own problem. It sees the theory employ two 
different standards when determining whether an obligation should obtain. 
In the case of the immigrant, the deprivation she experiences in being turned away 
counts as morally relevant. If that deprivation is significant enough, as it is in the case 
of someone forced to return to a non-rights fulfilling state, a liberal state must let her 
in. As we saw however, jurisdictionism does not apply any similar test to determining 
when members of the host society must take on a new obligation. This is why it does 
not matter if the French immigrant is a millionaire who will impose miniscule burdens 
on the receiving society. On the jurisdiction account, an obligation cannot be justified 
by reference to the lightness of its burdens.  
This is strange. For both parties, the immigrant and the host, there are costs and 
benefits to recognizing an obligation to admit, and to rejecting such an obligation. 
Such costs and benefits are not just financial, but include the negative and positive 
consequences in general. The potential costs to the immigrant in the transaction are 
crucial, but not the costs, or lack thereof, to the host. There is a threshold of severity 
that automatically generates a duty to admit the immigrant; but there is no reverse-
equivalent threshold of burdenlessness on the other side that can automatically permit 
                                                                                                                                      
Insofar as immigrants can and do have self-understandings of this kind, appeal to the project of agency 
does not justify turning them away while admitting citizens. Two, Blake equates citizens with current 
residents, but these are distinct categories. A foreigner might live in the United States for several years, 
on a diplomatic or student visa for example, and come to have domestic “resources and relationships.” 
Conversely, a citizen of a given country might be born abroad and have never set foot in that country. 
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entry. A receiving society can always turn away an immigrant from a liberal state, 
even if the cost of admitting them is miniscule, or even if they gain from the 
immigrant’s arrival.  
It is hard to see this asymmetry as justified. In one case the cost is borne by the 
subject of a potential obligation, in the other case the bearer. It seems more consistent 
with the moral equality underlying jurisdiction to say that costs to both parties matter 
when determining whether an obligation obtains.34 On such a view, we would make 
room for the thought that an obligation can be so minimal that we have no grounds to 
reject it.  
Blake argued against this idea by citing the example of someone who breaks into 
our home and cleans rather than steals. The fact that the consequence is positive, he 
maintains, does not oblige us to condone their action. Yet the housekeeping burglar 
example does not seem to the point. Having an uninvited person in our home changes 
the nature of what we might do there. Whereas before we may have enjoyed eating 
junk food in our underwear, or other activities we prefer to keep private, now we 
might feel embarrassed. Additionally, insofar as we expect to be in control of who 
enters our home, this sense of security is lost even in a case when an unwanted 
intruder cleans rather than steals. As a result, the housekeeping burglar scenario does 
not seem relevant to an analysis of obligations with minimal burdens, as the 
imposition the housecleaning burglar makes on us is fairly high, depriving us of a 
realm of privacy and security.  
                                                
34 Blake makes the fair point that moral equality does not always entail political equality. See his paper 
“Immigration,” in A Companion to Applied Ethics, R.G. Frey and Christopher Heath Wellman eds. 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 226. My point is that the cost-benefit asymmetry is inconsistent with moral 
equality. In this way I go beyond  
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There are many reasons why someone from one liberal state might want to 
immigrate to another. As mentioned above, they may have fallen in love with 
someone with deep ties to the receiving state. Or perhaps they dream of joining an 
industry that is centralized in one country, the way Hollywood is in the United States 
or Sumo wrestling is in Japan. It is no small matter to turn away would-be immigrants 
with these “ground projects,” as Blake notes.35 The entire direction of a life can be at 
stake, and being denied the opportunity to make life-defining choices can be 
devastating. Given this, it seems more consistent with jurisdiction’s recognition of 
moral equality to shift the burden of proof from the would-be immigrant to the state 
seeking to turn her away. On this view we start with a presumptive right of inclusion, 
and the burden of proof falls on the state seeking to deny the immigrant’s freedom. It 
would need to cite the possible negative effect on their welfare state or national 
culture, or some other genuinely liberal good cited in previous arguments for border 
control. The purpose of jurisdictionism however was to offer an argument that did not 
depend on case-by-case contingent considerations of the kind, but instead an 
automatic grounds for turning away immigrants from other liberal states. Once the 
costs, or lack thereof, of admitting immigrants are deemed relevant to assessing 
whether we have an obligation to allow them entry, we have left jurisdictionism 
behind. 
Obligation Reconsidered 
So far I have argued that jurisdictionism is not able to cogently demarcate an 
obligation to take on new obligation to fellow citizens but not foreigners; that the 
theory does in fact recognize such an obligation to non-citizens despite its explicit 
disavowal; that the softer construal of the theory avoids these problems but is not able 
                                                
35 “The Right to Exclude,” 14. 
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to justify turning away immigrants without also repelling citizens; and that because 
the theory grants moral weight to the consequences for immigrants of being excluded 
from a liberal state as, it employs an implausible asymmetry in determining whether 
obligations obtain, insofar as the consequences for the host society are given no 
equivalent normative weight. These are significant shortcomings. However, even if 
these issues could somehow be overcome, jurisdictionism would still suffer from an 
even bigger problem.  
Jurisdictionism portrays a new obligation as necessarily reducing our freedom.36 
The possibility of taking on a new obligation that frees us from other pre-existing 
obligations, however, shows that a new obligation need not reduce overall freedom. In 
other words, even if immigrants do generate a new obligation on the part of the 
receiving society, a reduction in freedom does not necessarily follow. If lost freedom 
is the issue, there will often be no grounds to turn immigrants away, even if they are 
from a liberal state. 
It seems undeniable that the arrival of new immigrants does generate new 
obligations on the part of resident citizens. Blake however does not distinguish 
between two different ways of coming under a new obligation which, when separated, 
call into question the notion that new obligations always reduce freedom.  
Suppose you are a lifeguard at a beach where I go for a swim. Just by being there I 
have generated a new obligation for you: at a minimum, you have to watch me while I 
                                                
36 Kates and Pevnick dispute Blake’s claim that jurisdictionism’s notion of increased obligation does 
not boil down to increased costs. As they put it, “it seems as if the primary way that immigration 
affects the freedom of a state’s current inhabitants is by increasing the costs (financial and otherwise) 
of upholding certain existing institutions,” Immigration, Jurisdiction and History,” 188. While Kates 
and Pevnick’s criticism is well made, it does not dispute, as I do here, the idea that the arrival of 
immigrants must decrease, rather than increase, the freedom of members of the receiving society. 
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go in the water, and possible also rescue me. But now imagine that I swim on a day 
that you are facing other pressing obligations: your lifeguard tower has broken and 
your boss says you have to fix it; someone you owe money to is coming to collect the 
debt; and you are planning to drive your children to an important medical 
appointment after your shift, only to discover that your car has broken down. Suppose 
I am so pleased with your lifeguarding that I undertake to release you from all these 
obligations. I fix the tower, repay the debt and drive your kids to the doctor while you 
wait for roadside assistance. In both scenarios my presence generates an obligation, to 
at least watch me swim. But in the second scenario my presence has the additional 
effect of relieving you of other, more onerous, obligations.  
In short in both scenarios you face a new obligation, but only in the first has your 
overall freedom been limited. In the second the overall scope of your obligations has 
been reduced and your freedom has increased. This illustrates the difference between 
a new additive obligation and a new obligation that, in taking it on, relaxes ones 
overall obligatory burden. Jurisdictionism does not distinguish between these 
different senses of taking on a new obligation, and instead assumes that every new 
obligation must reduce freedom. But given that the same person to whom our new 
obligation is owed can ease the burden of our other obligations, or even discharge 
them entirely, it follows that a new obligation does not necessarily reduce our 
freedom. 
Blake may want to reply that his concern is with new unwanted obligations, all 
else being equal. This reply would be to the point if his argument were to the end of 
outlining an ethics of obligation. His concern however is with immigration, and the 
new obligations immigrants generate will not always be equal. Indeed, they never will 
be. I do not mean that some immigrants will impose unique burdens on a receiving 
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state, as when the immigrant from France requires expensive medical treatment, 
which others do not. I mean that the obligations immigrants generate through their 
proximity are not the only change that occurs when they arrive. Their arrival has 
additional consequences that can and often does increase the freedom of resident 
citizens.  
Consider Blake’s example of jury duty. While it is true that I could serve on a jury 
in a trial of an accused immigrant, the person who immigrates can also serve as a jury 
member. The more people there are in the national pool of eligible jurors, the less 
likely that I will be selected. So while it is true that the immigrant increases the 
number of potential people who might become subject of trials which I have to jury, 
she simultaneously reduces the probability that I personally will have to serve as a 
juror in someone else’s trial.37 This reveals that a person who enters the jurisdiction of 
our state creates both new obligations and new freedoms.  
Immigrants increase the pool of people resident citizens might marry or start 
businesses with or learn languages from. To view them as creating a new obligation 
with no other effect is simply not true to reality. Before determining how immigrants 
affect the freedom of resident citizens therefore, we need to consider all the ways 
immigrants can increase that freedom by arriving. What might some of those ways 
be? 
The most obvious effect immigrants have is increasing a country’s population. 
Economists have noted the many positive effects a large population has when it 
comes to the provision of public goods such as monetary and financial institutions, a 
                                                
37 Given that one accused can require up to twelve jurors, an immigrant able to serve as a juror will 
create a greater obligation than he or she relieves me of. But this is a fact about the structure of the U.S. 
court system, not, as Blake suggests, entering my jurisdiction. (A system in which juries were 
composed of one person would generate as much possible obligation as it relieved). 
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judicial system, infrastructures for communication, police and crime prevention, 
public health, embassies and national parks. “While the costs of many publicly 
provided goods may increase proportionally with the population,” economists Alberto 
Alisina and Enrico Spolaore write, “often some aspects of these costs are independent 
of the number of users or taxpayers. Thus the per capita costs of many public goods 
generally decline with the number of taxpayers.”38 Each new immigrant thus brings 
down the cost each resident must pay for the provision of many important government 
functions. This increases the freedom of previous residents, who now bear a lesser 
portion of the cost of supporting public goods. 
A second positive benefit of increasing a country’s population through 
immigration is that it can increase security. Among a country’s public goods is its 
military. All else being equal, a country is stronger to the degree that it has more 
people who might be deployed as members of its armed forces. Each uptick in 
population thus gives a country a marginal increase in potential military resources that 
it might deploy in any conflict. And just as immigrant can take my place on a jury, 
they can potentially do the same in a conscription lottery, thereby increasing my 
freedom by sparing me the possible loss of my life in combat.  
In addition to sheer military strength, immigration can also increases a country’s 
cultural power. All else being equal, two countries with different population sizes will 
see the larger one more culturally influential than the smaller one. The United States 
for example has ten times the population of Canada, which is sensitive about the 
scope of American cultural influence. Were the populations of the two countries 
reversed, it is the U.S. that would worry about its cultural autonomy. While more than 
sheer size is required to make a country culturally influential, ceteris paribus, 
                                                
38 Alesina, Alberto and Enrico Spolaore, The Size of Nations. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 3. 
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countries with larger populations will have more secure cultural institutions. Members 
of their cultural class will be less likely to have to move abroad to find a cultural 
sector large enough to provide them with a rewarding livelihood, whether that sector 
be the film industry or academia. Indeed, Blake recounts his own experience as a 
Canadian immigrating to the United States to complete a PhD, which is in keeping 
with this phenomenon. The obligation to move to a foreign country to do well in a 
chosen profession is one that citizens of large countries are less likely to face than 
citizens of smaller societies. In this way citizens of larger states have greater 
opportunities that members of smaller societies do not. 
A fourth and final benefit of immigration concerns the economy. As Alesina and 
Spolaore note, the size of a country’s market, or the overall amount of wealth and 
individuals involved in its economy, is influenced by its openness to trade. Smaller 
countries can participate in large markets when both their economy and that of other 
nations are internationally open. When the international trading regime is less open to 
trade, it can significantly restrict the economy of small countries. Countries with 
larger economies are thus less dependent on the international trade regime, in that 
their larger population ceteris paribus allows them to enjoy the benefits of a larger 
economy and greater prosperity compared to a smaller nation. 
In all four areas, that concerning public goods, military strength, cultural power 
and protection from the vicissitudes of the international trade regime, countries with 
larger populations have an advantage over societies that are otherwise identical but 
have fewer members. In each case, the benefit sees immigrants ease the obligations or 
of the existing members of the receiving society. The financial and other burdens 
involved in sustaining domestic goods; the obligation to bear the cost of war; to either 
work to sustain domestic cultural institutions or to pursue one’s chosen profession 
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abroad; and the obligation to engage in trade treaties in order to achieve a certain level 
of prosperity; all of the obligations are ones immigration frequently (but of course, 
not always) reduces rather than increases. To hold that immigration necessarily 
reduces freedom therefore is false. We need to examine cases before making such a 
judgement. As such, there is no a priori justification for turning away immigrants 
from rights-fulfilling states on the grounds that they reduce our freedom. 
Waiving Rights 
I come now to the final problem for jurisdictionism. It concerns the hypothetical 
possibility of immigrants willing to wave their entitlement to having their rights 
protected and fulfilled.39 Perhaps they sign a contract, for example, relieving the 
receiving society of its responsibilities regarding rights fulfillment. On a conceptual 
level, such an arrangement would break any link between sheer presence and rights 
fulfillment, and so would call into question jurisdictionism’s central argument. 
Blake anticipates this objection. “I believe it would be morally objectionable to 
accept such terms, and even more impermissible to make the offer to a would be 
immigrant.”40 A key question however is why it would be immoral for a would-be 
immigrant to waive his or her entitlement to rights-fulfillment.  
In the case of a migrant from a developing country such as Mexico or Haiti, it is 
clear why a waiver would be morally objectionable. Immigrants from such countries 
are commonly motivated to leave by poverty. Allowing them to stay in a rich country 
                                                
39 The immigration literature contains proposals for immigrants to waive some rights. See Michael 
Huemer “Is There a Right to Immigrate?,” Social Theory and Practice 36.3 (2010), and Chandran 
Kukathas, “The Case for Open Immigration,” Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, Andrew 
Cohen and Christopher Wellman (eds.), (Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 2005), 213. Huemer and Kukathas 
restrict their proposals to waiving a right to the provisions of the welfare state, not to rights 
enforcement as such. 
40 Blake, “Immigration, Jurisdiction and Exclusion,” 120. 
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such as the United States only on the condition that they waive their entitlement to a 
minimum level of right fulfillment can potentially see them agree to such a proposal 
our of desperation. Jurisdictionism however seeks to exclude only immigrants from 
countries capable of fulfilling rights. Migrants from these nations would not be forced 
to choose between guaranteed rights fulfillment and baseline economic security. So 
why should they be excluded or a jurisdictional account? 
“On a jurisdictional account” bears emphasizing here. It is easy to think of 
negative results that would come from requiring some immigrants to waive away the 
legal enforcement of their rights. Such an arrangement might lead to the inefficient 
execution of government functions and wrongs done to individuals who never waived 
any rights. When paramedic arrive at an accident and take people to the hospital, it 
would add a laborious step if they had to identify who was entitled to rights-
fulfillment before or during the victims’ recovery. Additionally, the new need to make 
such a determination would create the possibility of a rights-bearing citizen being 
mistaken for a waivee. The rights-bearing population would therefore have a 
prudential reason not to allow waiver arrangements. Finally, waivers would also 
establish a precedent for the notion that some lives are worth less than others. Why 
stop at immigrants? The next step might be to allow some other group, such as 
convicted felons, to sign waivers, perhaps in exchange for reduced prison time. Or 
perhaps revoking legal protection might become a form of punishment itself, offered 
instead of prison sentences. 
Consideration of this kind however are not available to jurisdictionism. This is 
because they do not generate a right to exclude “derived simply in virtue of the state’s 
jurisdictional nature.” It is possible for a state to provide services inefficiently, to 
make mistakes about which individuals are entitled to rights-fulfillment, and to 
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devalue human life, all while remaining a state. Objections of the kind canvassed 
involve additional normative commitments, above and beyond those associated with 
statehood as such, and so defeat the point of a theory that seeks to derive a right to 
exclude from the jurisdictional nature of states and a background theory of obligation. 
A possible response to the waiver objection is for jurisdictionism to argue that a 
wrong is done to the immigrant from France who signs a waiver. But on what 
grounds, exactly, would it be wrong for her to waive her rights? There are cases in 
which we do permit individuals to occupy territory where their access to a 
government able to fulfill their rights is effectively non-existent. Antarctica for 
example is not a state and no state is obliged to fulfill the rights of everyone who 
ventures there. While people in Antarctica remain subjects of concern of their home 
governments, their remote location makes it impossible for their government to 
protect them. Historically however explorers, scientists and other individuals have 
been permitted to venture there. Individuals who make round the world sea voyages 
similarly travel beyond the effective reach of states and thus occupy positions in 
which for all practical purposes there is no law available to protect them. It seems as 
best conditionally rather than inherently immoral for individuals to voluntarily place 
themselves beyond the reach of human rights law. If that is the case, why not permit 
well-informed individuals to place themselves beyond the reach of the law inside 
existing states? 
In sum it does not seem obvious that a waiver arrangement should be prohibited 
due to an obvious automatic wrong to the immigrant. If that is so then jurisdiction 
does not derive a right to exclude from the jurisdictional nature of states: anyone 
willing to sign a waiver can be admitted. Alternatively, there may in fact be a wrong 
to the immigrant that I have been unable to identify. But it will require some 
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additional normative content. This will again defeat the purpose of jurisdictionism, 
which seeks to confine its central premises to the essential features of states and a 
background theory of obligation. 
Conclusion 
A major issue in the immigration debate is where the burden of proof should lie. 
Should immigrants be thought to have a right of entry, placing the burden on the state 
to justify their exclusion? 41 Or should states be thought to have a right to exclusion, 
placing the burden of proof on the immigrant to justify her admission? Despite its 
many differences from the immigration policies of contemporary liberal states, 
Jurisdictionism agrees with them on a fundamental point: the burden of proof is on 
immigrants to justify their admission, not on the state to show why immigrants should 
be excluded. Strictly speaking, nothing that has been said here challenges this idea at 
a general level.  But if the burden is in fact on the immigrant, it is not because of the 
reasons that jurisdictionism claims. The theory does not successfully establish that 
immigrants are excluded from the sphere of meta-obligation that extends to fellow 
citizens. Indeed, on its own account it recognizes such an obligation. When the theory 
is construed as recognizing new obligations to immigrants, it is not able to reject 
immigrants at the border without also rejecting some citizens. The theory seeks to 
justify turning away immigrants from rights-fulfilling states by judging the outcome 
for the immigrant using a consequence-sensitive test. Such a move however is not 
consistent with the theory’s rejection of any such test concerning whether receiving 
societies should be obliged to admit immigrants. Finally the theory employs an 
implausible understanding of the relationship between obligation and freedom that 
                                                
41 For a defense of such a view see Joseph Carens, The Ethics of Immigration (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013).  
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does not adequately recognize how immigrants can increase the freedom of receiving 
societies. And in the case of an immigrant from a rights-fulfilling state who waives 
his claim to legal protection, the theory cannot offer grounds for exclusion consistent 
with the goal of deriving such grounds from the nature of states. In the matter of 
immigration, the theory must ultimately be regarded as lacking moral jurisdiction.  
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